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It is obvious that Isaiah Berlin did not like Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and it is not 
difficult to think of some possible reasons. But I want to begin this chapter by 
suggesting that we can choose to be puzzled by this dislike of Rousseau perhaps a bit 
more than we usually are. Jeremy Waldron elsewhere in this collection discusses 
Berlin’s neglect of what he calls ‘Enlightenment constitutionalism’, focusing on the 
ways in which he seemed to lack interest in the hard work of designing a 
constitutional order in which self-interested, not always virtuous, ambitious men 
might live together in peace, prosperity, and freedom. Hearing Waldron’s paper, I was 
reminded of Rousseau’s attitudes to modern constitutionalism, some of which can be 
organized under his sarcastic label, ‘the masterpiece of policy in our century’.1 
Rousseau—like Berlin—was generally in favour of values such a freedom and 
equality, but was quite sceptical towards the actually existing constitutionalisms of his 
own day. Europe was heading into an age of violent revolutions, he thought, and no 
good would come of them—another point of agreement with Berlin’s profoundly anti-
revolutionary sensibility—and he also thought that the people we might call the 
progressive intellectuals of his day didn’t understand what they were doing with their 
schemes of social and political improvement, and that this would contribute to their 
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likelihood of going badly wrong.
2
 Rousseau, like Berlin, had one foot in the ‘Counter-
Enlightenment’, without surrendering entirely to it. Rousseau, like Berlin, described a 
number of different visions of human freedom and the good life across his various 
works, from Spartan citizens, to the denizens of Clarens, to solitary walkers. 
Unusually among Enlightenment intellectuals, perhaps—and the contrast with 
Voltaire is especially striking here—Rousseau was also not hostile to Judaism. 
Perhaps Berlin might have warmed to him on that score? Might his sharp antagonism 
towards Rousseau in part be rooted in what Freud once called the narcissism of small 
differences?  
 
No. The differences were bigger than that. And the antagonism—well, it was 
antagonistic. Here are some of the ways Berlin talks about Rousseau. In his radio 
address of November 1952, Rousseau’s tone, he tells us, is ‘exactly that…of a 
maniac…like a mad mathematician’ whose ‘answer has…a kind of lunacy’.3 In the 
manuscript from the same period that was posthumously published as Political Ideas 
in the Romantic Age, Berlin repeats his charge three times. Rousseau ‘preaches’ his 
argument about the general will, ‘with the almost lunatic intensity of a somewhat 
crack-brained visionary’; Rousseau looks for a way of squaring total liberty with total 
conformity, Berlin says, ‘with the fanatical cunning of a maniac’. ‘His polemic 
against the babel of voices all claiming to speak for nature is acute, entertaining and 
convincing’, Berlin writes, ‘until one realises that he is like the lunatic who rejects the 
claims of other inmates of his asylum to be Napoleon because he himself is 
Napoleon.’4 
 
In his notes for the Flexner Lectures which Berlin gave at Bryn Mawr earlier 
the same year, he uses the phrase ‘lunatic cunning’,5 and the only other example I can 
find of his using those words is with reference to Adolf Hitler, in his essay on 
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Winston Churchill that appeared in the Atlantic Monthly in 1949.
6
 And Berlin did 
associate Rousseau with the Fascist dictators:  
 
Rousseau is the greatest militant lowbrow of history, a kind of guttersnipe of 
genius, and figures like Carlyle, and to some extent Nietzsche, and certainly 
D. H. Lawrence and d’Annunzio, as well as révolté, petit bourgeois dictators 
like Hitler and Mussolini, are his heirs (FB 41). 
 
Rousseau always went along with Carlyle, Nietzsche, and Lawrence in Berlin’s mind: 
they appear together in Political Ideas in the Romantic Age (PIRA 2); in a letter to 
Violet Bonham Carter in 1954 he talks of the ‘old war – since Rousseau – between 
the civilised and superior and their enemies – not just barbarians, but corrupt & 
resentful victims & casualties of the social system – moral & emotional cripples of 
various kinds – sometimes brazen thunderers like Carlyle or D. H. Lawrence or A. J. 
P. Taylor…’ (who is an interesting addition to the demonology) (L II 465). Rousseau, 
Carlyle, Nietzsche, and Sorel are mentioned in a letter to Richard Wollheim in 1958, 
where they are also associated with Fascism (L II 611). In a 1972 letter to J. H. 
Huizinga, he repeats the language of ‘thundering’: ‘I should be as nervous, and 
indeed, frightened of meeting Rousseau if I had lived in the 18th century, as I should 
be of Carlyle or Wagner, or D. H. Lawrence or all the other “angry” prophets who 





Why was Rousseau such a problem for Berlin? Kevin Hilliard points us in the 
right direction in his contribution to this volume, when he reminds us that the 
Enlightenment was important for Berlin because he wanted to understand the origins 
of Marxism, drawing attention to ‘moral monism’, ‘scientism’, and ‘technocratic 
mechanism’. Rousseau obviously wasn’t either a scientist or a technocratic mechanist 
in anything like the way in which some of his contemporaries were. But Berlin seems 
to have become convinced that Rousseau played a key role in the history of this moral 
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monism. We know, for example, that Berlin was thinking about Rousseau when he 
was writing his book about Marx in the 1930s. In a letter to John Hilton from October 
1935, Berlin writes:  
 
My summer was peculiar: I am trying desperately to write a book on Marx: & 
find myself (a) unable to write at all for at least an hour after settling to, (b) 
when I begin I suddenly let loose a flood of words about Rousseau’s influence 
on the romantic style, & then remember that the relevance needs proving. It 
really is torture: anyhow I spent a month thus, & then fell ill of the quinsy (L I 
137). 
 
Rousseau’s influence on the romantic style was the topic to which he returned again 
and again and again over thirty years, without ever getting his thoughts into a state 
that he was willing to publish. For the Marx book, he worried here that it was hard to 
show relevance. The theme recurs in Political Ideas in the Romantic Age, drafted in 
1950-2, and, later, there were the 1965 lectures that have been published as The Roots 
of Romanticism. 
 
Just where is this coming from? Why this early and apparently deep 
conviction that ‘Rousseau’s influence on the romantic style’ might constitute part of 
the key for understanding Marxism? That is quite a peculiar thought to have. It looks 
as if the answer has quite a bit to do with the Russian Marxist Georgi Plekhanov. We 
know that Berlin was immersed in Plekhanov, for his thinking about Marx in general, 
and the subject of historical inevitability in particular. And if we turn to Plekhanov’s 
1895 book on The Development of the Monist View of History, it is striking that there 
is a discussion of Rousseau in that text, specifically in its fourth chapter, which, 
interestingly, claims to be a chapter on German idealism.
8
 It is something of a tricky 
discussion to follow, because Plekhanov is criticising Nikolay Mikhailovsky, who 
was disagreeing with Frederick Engels, who was writing about Rousseau in his Anti-
Dühring, so there are several layers of commentary in play. One question that was 
being chewed over in this discussion is whether Rousseau is, properly speaking, a 
dialectician; but more substantively, there was the question of progress, and 
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Rousseau’s relationship to narratives of progress in the context of his account of the 
contradictions of human social development and civilisation. It is my view that 
Berlin’s distinctive approach to Rousseau developed in the 1930s in part out of this 
encounter with Plekhanov, and that this framework for worrying about Rousseau 
remained with him for the rest of his life. This is a view that sits comfortably with the 
broader scholarship on Berlin. As his biographer Michael Ignatieff has written, 
 
Having fluent Russian gave him a route to Marx barred to most other English 
scholars, with the exception of E. H. Carr. Russian sources, especially 
Plekhanov, on the precursors of Marx led him to the Enlightenment thinkers; 
and from there forward to the nineteenth-century socialists. The reading he did 
between 1933 and 1938 provided Berlin with the intellectual capital on which 




If that is, as I suspect, the origin of Berlin’s own problem of Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau, what else shaped the way he approached that problem? The first obvious 
answer is philosophical anti-idealism. Plekhanov, as just noted, had treated Rousseau 
in a discussion of German idealism, with which Rousseau had also been associated by 
the older philosophical generation against whom Berlin and an only slightly older 
generation were reacting so sharply. The reason all these discussions of Rousseau 
include references to ‘true selves’ and ‘real wills’—the reason why the Rousseau we 
encounter from these writers is always a proto-Hegelian Rousseau, rather than a 
recognisably eighteenth-century Rousseau—is because these twentieth-century 
discussions are so very heavily mediated by late nineteenth-century philosophical 
idealism—the ideas of Bernard Bosanquet, in particular, but also those of T. H. 
Green. These were the political philosophers who had been so heavily criticised from 
the time of the First World War. We shouldn’t exaggerate the contribution of L. T. 
Hobhouse’s Metaphysical Theory of the State from 1918. That work is not so much an 
attack on philosophical idealism in general, as a book by a left-leaning idealist 
attacking the right-leaning versions of the theory.
10
 (His subsequent books, after all, 
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included both The Rational Good and The Elements of Social Justice.
11
) But in 
Berlin’s undergraduate Oxford, as Joshua L. Cherniss has pointed out, H. A. Prichard 
lectured on T. H. Green on political obligation in 1930 (and we know that Berlin 
attended those lectures), and E. F. Carritt lectured specifically on ‘the general will’ in 
1932 (though we don’t know whether Berlin attended those).12  
 
The anti-idealist pendulum continued to swing during the 1930s and 1940s. ‘It 
is fashionable nowadays to discredit the theory of the general will, and an attempt to 
rehabilitate it is not likely to receive much sympathy’, wrote B. Mayo, in a short 
article on the general will published in the 1950 volume of Philosophy.
13
 And it is 
perhaps significant in this context that the better books that were being published on 
Rousseau in the 1930s were by more historically-minded scholars—Alfred Cobban 
and John Stephenson Spink
14—and not by the philosophers, who were losing their 
interest. The chief exponent of philosophical idealism in the British universities was 
Michael Oakeshott, but he never had much to say about Rousseau,
15
 and the political 
theorist who was most interested in working more constructively with the categories 
of Rousseau’s political thought was G. D. H. Cole, who produced the Everyman 
edition of The Social Contract that is still widely used today, but it is fair to say that 
what appears to have been Cole’s ambition to synthesise aspects of Rousseau’s 





One consequence of the fact that it was the generation who taught Berlin 
which was most directly concerned with the counter-offensive against philosophical 
idealism was that Berlin never seems to have felt that he really had to engage with 
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Rousseau as a serious theorist. What I mean by this is that Berlin never writes about 
Rousseau as if he had encountered a reasonably well-worked out body of 
psychological, moral, social, and political theory, had noticed various problems with 
it, and had then tried to construct more adequate theories in their place. I can’t think 
of any passage in Berlin where he treats any of Rousseau’s theoretical arguments 
especially patiently, or seriously. Certainly—and notoriously—Berlin’s occasional 
invocations of Rousseau’s deliberately paradoxical formulation about being ‘forced to 
be free’ have literally nothing to do with the argument that Rousseau was actually 
making when he deployed those words. Berlin instead latches onto the phrase, and 
then uses it to illuminate a more general attitude that he thinks he finds in Rousseau’s 
political thought. 
 
In addition to Plekhanov, and anti-idealism, the next source that structured and 
shaped Berlin’s encounter with Rousseau was the American literary critic, Irving 
Babbitt, especially his 1919 book, Rousseau and Romanticism.
17
 Indeed, Berlin was 
interested in Babbitt well before he was working on his Marx book. For example, 
Babbitt’s influence is apparent—and Babbitt is cited directly—in an article, ‘Some 
Procrustations’, that appeared in the May 1930 issue of the Oxford Outlook, a 
periodical with which the young Berlin was involved.
18
 I don’t know exactly when 
Berlin first read Babbitt’s Rousseau book, but my hunch is that it was earlier rather 
than later. If the distinctive problem with which he was wrestling from the mid 1930s 
was Rousseau’s influence on romantic style, for example, it makes sense that he was 
already reading, by then, the major twentieth century work that addresses exactly this 
subject. And Babbitt’s book clearly had an impact on Berlin. If you look at the 
marked-up typescript of what was eventually published as Political Ideas in the 
Romantic Age, for example, one feature that is striking is the almost complete lack of 
footnotes—perhaps not surprising, for a text that was substantially dictated. The notes 
in the book that was published from the manuscript have overwhelmingly been 
supplied by its editor, Henry Hardy. But when Berlin discusses Rousseau, there, in the 
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Babbitt was obviously very critical of Rousseau, and Berlin took over a big 
chunk of that critical agenda—but it seems to me that the combination of anti-
idealism and Babbitt created a problem for Berlin that he never quite worked out how 
to resolve, which partially in turn explains the way in which he returned to scratch the 
Rousseau-and-romanticism itch over a period of thirty years without ever getting it 
quite right. The problem relates to the two quite opposed versions of Rousseau that 
we find here. For the late nineteenth-century philosophical idealists, as much as for 
their early twentieth-century critics, Rousseau is a proto-Hegelian, an arch-rationalist. 
For Babbitt, on the other hand, Rousseau is the man of feeling, sentiment, emotion, 
and imagination. It’s practically impossible to synthesize these two approaches to 
Rousseau, and I’m not sure Berlin was ever able to do so. For the argument about 
‘positive’ freedom that Berlin wanted to prosecute, he required a starkly rationalist 
Rousseau, but the single book on Rousseau to which he appears to have been most 
powerfully drawn presented a very different kind of Rousseau indeed. This tension 
could have been resolved simply by choosing one interpretation of Rousseau over the 
other. But Berlin couldn’t manage to do this, and I suspect that the reason owes to the 
connection that he forged in his mind between Rousseau and Marxism. It was Marx 
who, in Berlin’s view, had forged a powerful synthesis between the traditions of 
Enlightenment and Romanticism. Rousseau was interesting to him as a precursor of 
Marx precisely because these two streams seemed to come together somehow in his 
writings, too. But without being able to come to a coherent all-things-considered view 
of Rousseau, he was left at something of an impasse.  
 
 The final major influence on Berlin’s thinking about Rousseau was Jacob 
Talmon, whom Berlin met after the Second World War. But before turning to 
Talmon, I shall say something first about Harold Laski, who plays what seems to me 
to be a curious role in this story of Berlin’s reception of Rousseau. Arie Dubnov has 
suggested—though without much direct evidence—that one of the stimuli that made 
made Berlin want to write on Marx was dislike of the way in which Laski wrote on 
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 But when we turn to Rousseau, three things catch the eye. The first is 
that Berlin more or less takes over Laski’s approach to Rousseau in his 1930 book, 
Liberty in the Modern State.
21
 In contrast to Hobhouse’s earlier Metaphysical Theory 
of the State, this book really does make a starkly anti-idealist political argument, in 
which Laski argues that what is wrong with theories like Rousseau’s is the way in 
which they crowd out space for dissidence. The idealist theory, wrote Laski, 
‘contradicts all the major facts of experience’; it is ‘a denial of that uniqueness of 
individuality’. ‘For as I encounter the state, it is for me a body of men issuing orders’. 
Laski insists that there must be a space for respecting what Rawls will later call 
conscientious refusal, a space that he thinks idealism must deny. ‘A true theory of 
liberty, I urge, is built upon a denial of each of the assumptions of idealism…’. What 





 The second connection comes via Talmon himself. Laski had supervised 
Talmon’s doctoral dissertation at the London School of Economics on ‘The doctrine 
of poverty’ in the Middle Ages,23 and he gets a mention in the acknowledgements to 
The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy. But the relationship was not always a smooth 
one. In a letter to Berlin, Talmon confessed to complex thoughts about Laski, on 
being asked to write for a Hebrew periodical: ‘I am somewhat embarrassed: I would 
have to say some very harsh things about that most ambiguous figure, while the man 
did his best to earn my gratitude.’24 And Talmon’s own book reverses Laski’s own 
argument at a critical moment. There’s a 1930 Laski pamphlet on ‘The Socialist 
Tradition in the French Revolution’, which appears in Talmon’s bibliography, and the 
narrative Laski offers there is broadly similar to that which Talmon presents in The 
Origins of Totalitarian Democracy, except that when Laski gets excited, because 
things are getting properly socialist in the manner of which he approves, these are 
exactly the moments—culminating of course in the examination of ‘Gracchus’ 
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Babeuf—where Talmon locates the full-blown emergence of the messianic model of 




 Laski is also interesting, furthermore, in light of his own relationship to 
Babbitt’s work. He was not only the most prominent public figure in England to be 
both interested in and critical of Babbitt, but in another curiously Berlin-themed 
moment, he connected Babbitt’s conservative stance to Joseph de Maistre’s image of 
the public executioner, which Berlin would later do so much to popularise, in his 
1948 book on The American Democracy.
26
 (While I’m exploring these kinds of links, 
I can add that Babbitt’s most important follower in England was T. S. Eliot, who 
wrote to Berlin in November 1952 to say how much he enjoyed his Rousseau radio 





 And so, to Jacob Talmon and the post-war scene. Before Talmon, Robert 
Nisbet had been the most prominent scholar to make a sustained argument for a 
‘totalitarian’ interpretation of Rousseau’s political thought,28 and there had also of 
course been Bertrand Russell’s casual remark in his 1945 History of Western 
Philosophy that ‘Hitler is an outcome of Rousseau; Roosevelt and Churchill, of 
Locke’.29 Before Talmon, there had been other scholars, too, who had floated a 
distinctive notion of ‘totalitarian democracy’, such as Bertrand de Jouvenel and E. H. 
Carr.
30
 But Talmon commands attention not only because he placed Rousseau at the 
centre of his story about totalitarian democracy, but also because of his closeness to 
Isaiah Berlin. The two men appear to have met in 1947, and, as Berlin recalled, they 
were ‘discussing what afterwards became the central theme of his most famous book, 
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Totalitarian Democracy, and since my ideas were tending in the same direction, I 
found that talking with him was highly stimulating and intellectually delightful.’31 
 
 Talmon’s ‘most famous book’, The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy, was 
published in 1952, and this year also marks the high tide of Berlin’s own dealings 
with Rousseau. Early in the year he had been in Pennsylvania in order to deliver the 
Flexner Lectures on ‘The Rise of Modern Political Ideas in the Romantic Age’. That 
year, he is also thought to have completed his draft—never published in his own 
lifetime—of the related book, Political Ideas in the Romantic Age. In the Autumn, he 
delivered his famous radio talks on ‘Freedom and its Betrayal’, the second of which 
was devoted to Rousseau and was first broadcast on 5 November. Those radio talks in 
turn prompted a leader column in The Times, written by T. E. Utley, which gave rise 
in turn to a flurry of correspondence on the letters page, to which Berlin contributed, 
and on the penultimate day of the year, 30 December 1952, Berlin wrote three letters 
which bear on my topic, and with which I shall conclude. 
 
 The Times leader had juxtaposed the ‘rationalist philosophy’ of, for example, 
Rousseau with the ‘empirical liberalism’ of Mill, and had praised the latter. ‘The 
search for a single sovereign principle, for an all-embracing ideology, has been the 
bane of the modern world.’ But Utley departed from Berlin’s line of reasoning when 
he observed that  
 
Rationalist philosophy has been able to do the harm which it has done because 
it satisfied an undeniable human need—the need for the faith that history has a 
purpose and that politics is subject to a consistent moral law. In the past, that 
faith was supplied—as it can be still—by a Christian interpretation of 
history…32 
 
The correspondence that followed began with a letter from Emile Cammaerts 
endorsing Utley’s pro-Christian conclusion—‘Christianity…appears to-day as the 
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best means of checking the impatience of those who, while denying the existence of 
evil, do not hesitate to foster hatred and use brutal force in order to achieve their own 
end’33—but it was the third letter, from Edgar W. Jones, which directly took issue 
with Berlin’s interpretation of Rousseau. Jones had remarked that ‘the general will is 
only the name for that modification which each person must make in his own real will 
when he seeks to take into account the real wills of other people’, and that, ‘If this is 
so, Rousseau is really a good democrat after all…’ Berlin, he complained (sensibly 
enough, in my own view) was trying ‘to compress eighteenth-century thinking into a 
kind of Hegelian strait-jacket which does violence to important parts of its 
anatomy’.34 Berlin’s own contribution to the correspondence was a somewhat snotty 
reply to Jones (L II 343-4), who in turn wrote in again to complain that Berlin had 
‘grossly misrepresented what I wrote’.35 
 
 Turn, finally, to the three letters of 30 December. The first is a letter to a 
former student, Denis Paul, in which Berlin discusses his radio talks and restates his 
general ideas about freedom (L II 352-3). The second is a letter to Herbert Elliston, in 
which Berlin registers his disagreement with aspects of Utley’s leader, and also 
discusses Talmon. ‘I have much respect for Talmon’s book’, he wrote, ‘but I think it 
erroneous in one or two ways, although in general constructed along very much the 
right lines’.36 Finally, there is a letter to Talmon himself, which contains a long 
passage on Rousseau that is of greatest interest for present purposes, and worth 
reproducing in full: 
 
God knows, the awful shadow of Marx broods over the entire thing, and I do 
not know whether to put him in or keep him out, and I still feel terribly 
obscure and muddled about Rousseau. You and I think that he is the father of 
Totalitarianism in a sense. Why do we think this? Because of the despotism of 
the general will. What does he, in fact, say? He talks about, (a) the necessity to 
keep out selfish and sectional interests, so that each man shall ask himself 
what is it right to do from the point of view of the community in general; this 
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assumes that there is such a thing as a general interest or some course of action 
which are better for entire societies than others, and this, although none too 
clear, obviously is in some sense valid; so far so good. One may raise 
questions about how one ever knows which course is best and then one may 
reasonably answer that Rousseau’s recommendations about eliminating selfish 
and sectional interests, as practical tips, have a certain value, at least in some 
situations, and that the difference between what is traditionally considered to 
be the right frame of mind for members of the English Parliament as against, 
say, American Senators, who quite openly represent territorial or economic 
interests, is a case in point. Again so far so good. Furthermore, everyone in the 
Assembly has the right to express his view as he pleases. Any suppression 
automatically breaks the social contract and destroys the general will, the 
Sovereign, etc., so that liberty seems to be guaranteed. But once the decision 
has been reached the dissidence must form and this, I suppose, is the ordinary 
practice of all democratic assemblies, from Quaker meetings to Lenin’s 
Regional Central Committee and Politbureau. What then do we complain of? 
Simply, (a) that Rousseau thinks that an absolutely objectively true answer can 
be reached about political questions; that there is a guaranteed method of 
doing so; that his method is the right one; and that to act against such a truth is 
to be wrong, at worst mad, and therefore properly to be ignored, and that all 
these propositions are false? (b) the mystique of the soi commun and the 
organic metaphor which runs away with him and leads to mythology, whether 
of the State, the Church, or whatever. Is this all? or is there more to complain 
of? I don’t feel sure. The muddle is so great. The precise transition from 
absolute freedom to absolute necessity is still not very clear to me – it is in 
Hegel but not in myself. I suppose I must read him again, but if you have 
thoughts I wish you would tell me. (L II 354-5) 
 
The letter that Talmon said that he would write to Berlin about Rousseau does not 
appear amongst the Berlin papers, and perhaps it does not exist.
37
 And although 
Berlin says ‘I suppose I must read him again’, I am not sure that he ever made real 
further progress with Rousseau—though we do know, from the testimony of John 
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 MS. Berlin 286, fol. 3. 
 14 
Rawls, that Rousseau was covered in the class he taught with Stuart Hampshire the 
following term in Oxford, at the start of 1953.
38
 ‘Now I must sit down to the hideous 
task of writing a book’, Berlin also wrote in that same letter to Talmon.  
 
But the hideous task, of course, was never completed. 
                                                 
38
 Thomas Pogge, John Rawls: His Life and Theory of Justice (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2007), p. 16: ‘Rawls was especially impressed with a seminar taught by Berlin and 
Hampshire, with Hart’s active participation, in the winter of 1953. This covered Condorcet, 
Rousseau’s Social Contract, John Stuart Mill’s “On Liberty,” Alexander Herzen, G. E. 
Moore, and two essays by John Maynard Keynes.’ Berlin was impressed by Rawls: ‘There is 
of course an American here better than all these I should think called Rawls…’ Letter to 
Morton White, 4 March 1953, L II 364. 
